Warren A. Trest
from Chapter 10: "Mission Accomplished" and the Epilogue
As the siege on Phnom Penh tightened in late February and March, the airlift was expanded further to include commercial DC-8s hauling rice on shuttles between Tan Son Nhut and Pochentong Airport. After his visit to Phnom Penh in mid- February, Admiral Gaylor reported on the hopelessness of the military situation, stating that he believed a political settle- ment was urgent.
The danger to aircrews from the rocketing and shelling of Pochentong Airport grew worse by the day. General Marshall, vice CINCPACAF, visited U-Tapao on 17 March and reported that Colonel Baginski was "doing a magnificent job, particularly in working with the contract aircrews, keeping their spirits up and being sensitive to their worries." He noted that the contract aircrews were growing increasingly worried about the shelling and rocketing of Pochentong and might have quit if not for Baginski's superb leadership. The words of one crew member - "I am so goddamned scared" - summed it up for all...
During the final days of the war, von Marbod brought his team out from Washington to oversee the evacuation of South Vietnamese aircraft and helicopters, including spare parts and equipment, and to keep as many as possible from falling into Communist hands.
General Aderholt explained that the plan was to fly everything into Thailand, to salvage as much as they could for shipment back to the United States, then give the excess planes and equipment to the Thais. He noted that the Thais had their eye on the F-5E Freedom Fighters that came out of Vietnam, but he could not get authority to turn the planes over to them. The Thais did receive a number of excess aircraft, however, and were grateful for it.
The von Marbod team arrived in Saigon four days before the city fell to the Communists, and traveled to the nearby base at Bien Hoa, where they recovered some valuable equipment while under artillery fire from the enemy. Returning to Saigon, von Marbod called on Ambassador Martin, who warned him against foolishly risking his life since the soon expected truce would allow for evacuation of equipment as well as people.
An official history noted that von Marbod apparently lacked Martin's confidence and returned to Bien Hoa, again under fire, to supervise the recovery of additional high-value equipment.
Just hours before North Vietnamese troops overran Bien Hoa, Aderholt got a frantic call from von Marbod, who was pinned down in a trailer, under fire. "Where is that goddamn airplane you were supposed to send me?" he yelled. Earlier, Aderholt had arranged for a Bird air flight to Bien Hoa to bring von Marbod and his team back to Thailand. The plane had not arrived. "There is something wrong," he told von Marbod. "I will send another plane." He called Major General Earl Archer, General Burns' chief of staff at Nakhon Phanom, and learned that Burns had ordered him to stop the plane because there was a surface-to-air missile threat. "There is one angry goddamn assistant secretary over there with a team," Aderholt told Archer. He called Baginski and said, "Whatever you've got, divert it into Bien Hoa now and pick up von Marbod!"
Concurrent with the Communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the Pathet Lao moved to take over in Laos. After the Birdair contract was canceled, General Aderholt got an urgent call to evacuate Hmong tribesmen who were abandoned at Long Tieng. The caller said, "We have to get C-130s into Vang Pao's headquarters in Long Tieng or they are going to be slaughtered."
Aderholt knew that Air America planes were still available at Udorn to assist the Hmong, but there was likely no evacuation plan. He called U-Tapao. Two C-130s had not been returned to Clark yet, but there were no crews left at U-Tapao to fly the planes into Laos. Aderholt heard that Matt Hoff, a Birdair pilot, was at Don Muang waiting to board a flight home. He then called the Thai air marshal who ran the airport and asked him to stop Hoff, even if they had to arrest him. "There was one agitated American when he got on the line to me because he missed his plane," Aderholt recalled.
Aderholt hurriedly explained the situation to Hoff, who said, "Well, you've already messed everything up. How do we get paid?" Aderholt said he would pay them from the military assistance fund. Hoff said, "How much?" Aderholt said, "I don't give a damn! This is a matter of life and death! What about five thousand dollars a trip?" Hoff said, "Good!" Aderholt said, "We'll pay all the crew five thousand dollars a trip. But get your ass in gear, we don't have time to lose!" He then called the JCS chairman, General Brown, and got authority to divert the C-130. "General, do anything you want," Brown said. "Whatever you think you can put in there to help the Hmong, you do it. You have my support."
Aderholt called U-Tapao and ordered them to launch the plane as soon as Hoff arrived. Aderholt said the last flight out of Long Tieng set a record, carrying three hundred refugees stacked in the C-130, even on the tailgate, to freedom at Udorn.
The C-130 and the smaller Air America planes could not evacuate all the refugees, and thousands had to be left behind...
... "The Hmong believed they had a trustworthy ally, the United States of America, who would stand by them to the end, and never go back on the solemn promises that had been agreed to," Aderholt said. Thirteen years later they had suffered terrible losses - nearly 40,000 out of a population of about 250,000.
When the Americans pulled out, Vang Pao and some of his people were allowed into the United States, but most were abandoned in Laos, where they were brutally punished for their wartime alliance. "They were doused with deadly chemicals from the air, forced from their homes and villages, and incarcerated," Aderholt said. "Many died being tortured or starved to death."
Those who fled to Thailand were incarcerated in squalid refugee camps for years and now faced forced repatriation back to Laos. "This was their reward for years of tying down thousands of North Vietnam's best soldiers in Laos to help relieve the pressure on U.S. forces in South Vietnam," Aderholt said. "Had they not done so, those soldiers would have been available to fight in the south, drastically increasing our casualties there."