Warren A. Trest
from the Introduction and Chapter 4: "The Invasion's Final Hours"
In the predawn hours of April 19, 1961, six Douglas B-26 Invaders disguised with Cuban markings took off from a secret CIA base at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaraugua, and headed north over the moonlit waters of the Caribbean toward Cuba. Puerto Cabezas, known as "Happy Valley" to the pilots and crews, was the staging base for the ill-fated invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Armed to the teeth, the twin-engine B-26s flew the mission in two-ship formations - taking to the skies at 30 minute intervals to stagger their arrivals over the target area. The bombers were launched in a desperate attempt to stave off defeat for the brigade of Cuban exiles who were stranded on the embattled beachhead and fighting for their lives.
For the first time during the invasion Aabama Air National Guard pilots were at the controls of warplanes taking part in the fray. Prior to April 19th the Alabama guardsmen were not allowed to fly combat missions in support of the brigade. The White House feared that an American pilot might be shot down and expose the U.S. Government's role in the covert affair. President John F. Kennedy, newly inaugurated and concerned about the political fallout from the invasion, was adamant that operations be carried out in such a way that the U.S. Government could plausibly deny any involvement. Unfortunately, the concern for "plausible deniability" within the decision-making process took precedence over military requirements.
Pre-invasion air strikes against Cuban airfields were held to a minimum to mask U.S. involvement. This was done on direct orders from the President. Remnants of Fidel Castro's air forces, including two British-built Sea Fury prop fighters and two Lockheed T-33 jet trainers with fighter capability, survived the attacks to strike back against the invasion forces and their limited air support. The fighters attacked the landing forces at will, sank their ammunition and supplies coming in from the sea, and wreaked havoc on the B-26s coming to their aid. The denial of U.S. fighter cover from the carrier Essex steaming offshore yielded command of the air to Castro's few surviving planes.
The minimal bombing strikes two days before the landing on April 17 not only failed to destroy all of Castro's planes, but alerted the Cuban dictator that the landing forces were on the way. On the morning of the 17th Castro's planes sank two of the brigade's ships, the Houston and the Rio Escondido, loaded with war supplies. Five of the liberation air force's 16 B-26s and their crews were lost on the day of the landing. Flying one and sometimes two missions a day - each mission six and one-half hours over open waters without navigational aids - the Cuban pilots were physically and emotionally exhausted by the third day of the invasion. Air Guard Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Shannon recalled that the Cuban pilots were in no shape to fly on the 19th, but some flew anyway.
Faced with exhausted aircrews and a desperate situation on the ground in Cuba, the CIA authorized Alabama guardsmen to fly missions on the 19th. Four Guard pilots and four crewmen stepped forward. The lead formation on the 19th was commanded by Billy "Dodo" Goodwin, a major in the Air Guard, and Gonzalo Herrera, a fearless Cuban pilot known as "El Tigre" by his compatriots. The other Alabama Guard pilots were Joe Shannon, Riley Shamburger, and Thomas Willard "Pete" Ray. Crew members from Alabama included Leo Francis Baker, Wade Gray, Carl "Nick" Sudano, and James Vaughn. A second exiled Cuban pilot, Mario Zuniga, and his observer rounded out the strike force.
At the last minute the B-26s were promised air cover from the Essex, but in a tragic mix-up the jet fighters did not show until the bombers were leaving the target area. The Navy pilots had orders not to fire unless fired upon. When the unprotected bombers arrived over the beachhead at sunrise, the Cuban fighters were waiting for them. The two lead B-26s piloted by Goodwin and Herrera sustained hits but delivered their ordnance and were returning to Puerto Cabezas when the other bombers arrived in the target area. Two of the B-26s came under attack as they approached the beachhead. Joe Shannon was able to outmaneuver the T-33s, but his wingman Riley Shamburger was hit. Shamburger and his observer Wade Gray went down with their plane. Further inland, a Cuban fighter brought down Pete Ray's bomber as he pressed the attack against heavily defended targets. Ray and Leo Francis Baker, a flight engineer, survived the crash only to be killed in a shootout with Cuban soldiers.
That afternoon the beachhead collapsed and the Cuban exiles, having exhausted their supplies and ammunition, surrendered to Castro's army. It had taken just seventy-two hours to crush the invasion. Some survivors were rescued by U.S. ships, but the brigade took heavy casualties including 114 men who died and 1,189 who were taken prisoner. Fidel Castro held the prisoners until December 1963 when he ransomed them to the United States for $53 million worth of food and drugs. A humiliating defeat for the U.S. Government, the Bay of Pigs was a tragedy from which the Cuban exiles and their liberation movement would never recover.
…When [the CIA's] Grayston Lynch talked by radio with [2506 Brigade Commander] Pepe San Roman at midday on the 19th, he said they would go in and evacuate the brigade if things got too rough. San Roman replied that the brigade would not leave the island, but would fight to the end if they had to. He was running out of ammunition at the time, and Castro's forces were closing in. Two hours later the brigade headquarters was under fire and men were fighting on the beach and in the water. San Roman's last transmission stated that he was destroying his maps and equipment because Castro's tanks had broken through and were converging on the headquarters. "The radio went silent," wrote Lynch. "It was over."
The brigade had fought bravely, even brilliantly some experts said. As demonstrated early in a key battle for Rotunda de Playa Larga, where three roads joined the coastal highway, the brigade's soldiers put up a ferocious fight against superior odds. Less than fifty men forming a roadblock at the rotunda held off 1,000 of Castro's men all day Monday and through the night before being forced to withdraw after sunrise Tuesday morning. Erneido Olivia, second in command to San Roman, called the battle "the night of the heroes." It was the heaviest fighting of the invasion.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, jr., who conducted the Inspector General's survey of the Cuban Operation in October 1961, estimated that San Roman's men, aided by the B-26s flying from Nicaragua, inflicted ten to one casualties on the other side in the three-day conflict. Approximately 1,500 Cuban exiles were pitted against Castro's 20,000 regulars with another 80,000 men in reserve. In addition to the warplanes that survived the airfield attacks, Castro's infantry was supported by Russian-made artillery, antiaircraft guns, and as many as 100 tanks against five that the invaders got ashore. The brigade suffered 103 casualties, including fourteen Cuban and American airmen. Castro's forces took 1,189 prisoners. At least two dozen men were rescued by CIA operatives and the U.S. Navy. The remaining hundred or so men were unaccounted for.